Although there are several measurement and model based approaches to assessing the compliance of critical computing systems with reliability requirements, applying these approaches requires sophisticated data analysis and mathematical skills so that reliability engineers often hesitate to pe$orm such a task. The need to develop cost effective, credible, and easy-to-use tools to reduce difliculties in pegomzing such tasks has thus been apparent. This paperpresents a tool of this kind -MEADEP. MEADEP integrates techniques in graphical user integace programming, database engineering, dependability modeling, and statisticaVnumerica1
Introduction
As safety and other critical systems in which software plays decision making and control roles arc incrcasingly applied in the field such as nuclear power safety management and air traffic control, it becomes necessary to develop objective methods to assess the compliance of these systems with reliability requirements. In this regard, quantitative assessment of dependability' for critical digital systems is a vital issue. There are three general approaches to dependability evaluation for computing systems: in-process assessment, pre-deployment assessment, and in-field assessment [Nei196] . This classification can be mapped to the three phases of dependability evaluation defined in [Iyer96] : design phase, prototype phase, and operational phase.
In the design phase, a system is typically modeled by using probabilistic models [Laprie84, Scott87, Arlat901 or simulation methods [Goswami93, Tausworthe961. This approach relies on component level failure rates published in handbooks or supplied by manufacturers. The approach provides an early indication of system dependability, but many assumptions have to be made in order to build analytical or simulation models. These assumptions as well as the underlying parameters later need to he validated by actual measurements.
In the prototype phase, assessment is typically done by product ' The dependability concept was proposed in the 15" International Symposium on Fuult-Tolerant Computing [Laprie85] and revised in . Dependability is defined as the "property of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service i t delivers." Major measures of dependability include reliability, availability, safety. and mnintainnbility.
testing and reliability growth modeling [Musa87] . This approach involves fewer assumptions than the first, but it can address the reliability growth only for software with failure rates from 10.' to 1 0-5 per hour [Butler93] . Reliability growth models do not fumish creditable predictions when there are few observed failures, as must be the case for safety systems. In addition, these models lack ability to account for the internal structure of a complex system with hardware, software, redundancy provisions and fault recovery processes.
Measurement-based dependability evaluation [Iyer96, Tang95al is well suited for the operational phase. In many cases, it is possible to use a combination of measurement and dependability models to develop a quantitative assessment as shown in [Hsueh88, Lee93, Tang951. Early studies of DEC [Castill0821 and IRM [IyerXS] operating system failures found that there is a strong correlation between system workload and software failures. Further research on mature fault tolerant real-time systems showed that residual software faults lead to a failure behavior which can be characterized by a failure rate and a certain failure arrival distribution [Nagle82,  Adams84, Hsueh881 and that a majority of such failures could be masked (without obvious impact on applications) by the use of physical redundancy [Gray90, Lee95, Tang9.51. These results provide a basis for modeling software failures as a stochastic process for realtime and fault tolerant systems.
Not only can the measurement-based dependability evaluation approach be used in the system operational phase, it can also been applied to the late testing phase of a software system as demonstrated in [Tang95] . The primary advantage of this approach lies in use of measurements and models for interpretation of the measurements. Based on measurements, the approach produces various dependability measures (MTBF, availability, etc.) with stated confidence levels. The measurement-based dependability evaluation methodology developed in [Tang961 consists of feasible methods in data collection and processing, statistical analysis, and dependability modeling. It not only evaluates system dependability based on a statistically significant number of failures, but it also evaluates system dependability lower bounds at a specified confidence level where failures were rare.
However, applying measurement-based dependability evaluation appioach involves difficulties in data processing, parameter estimation, model specification, and appropriate mapping from data to models. It is costly and time consuming for reliability engineers to overcome these difficulties. The need to develop tools that can reduce these difficulties has thus been apparent. In this paper, we introduce such a tool, MEADEP (MEAsure DEPendability), and demonstrate its application in modeling and analyzing dependability for a nuclcar power plant's safety system. MEADEP integrates techniques in graphical user interface (GUI) programming, database engineering, dependability modeling, and statisticdnumerical analysis, to provide non-expert users an easy-tooperate environment for producing dependability assessments for real systems. Use of the tool on failure data from measurements produces quantitative assessments of dependability for critical systems, while greatly reducing requirements for specialized skills in data processing, statistical analysis, and dependability modeling from the user. Because MEADEP facilitates the use of measurement-based dependability analysis methods and reduces the cost of such analyses by providing various data processing and dependability analysis functions, it can become an integral part of engineering projects where dependability is an important consideration.
Overview of MEADEP
MEADEP is a failure data based dependability analysis and modeling tool. Dependability measures generated by MEADEP are either directly obtained from data, such as failure rate and event distribution, or evaluated by combined use of failure data and dependability models, such as system level reliability and availability. Thus A library of dependability models: A library of dependability models, including primitive models for typical fault-tolerant architectures and complex models for real critical systems are included in MEADEP for reuse by users.
User friendly interface: For all of its functions, MEADEP provides a user-friendly GUI featuring menus, dialogs, pictures, printing previews, and extensive on-line help information.
MEADEP was developed on Windows 95 using Microsoft Visual C++, the Open Database Connectivity interface, the IMSL@ Numerical libraries, and the Olectra@ Chart graphical package. The parameter estimation methods used were based on [Kececioglu93, Tang951, and the model solution methods used were based on [Trivedi82, Reibman881.
Application of MEADEP on a Nuclear Power Plant Safety System
In critical applications, there are two broad categories of digital systems: (1) continuously operating real-time systems, and (2) Most previous work on measurement-based dependability evaluation has been for systems in this category as reviewed in [Iyer96] . The second category requires successful responses to emergent demands and a failed response can result in the loss of life and property. The nuclear power plant's safety system is a typical representative of this category. MEADEP has been applied to the first category in evaluating operational availability for two air traffic control systems [Tang97] . This section demonstrates the MEADEP application on the second category by analyzing the sensitivity of the plant Mean Time Between Hazards (MTBH) to key parameters for a nuclear power plant's safety system.
The major functions of MEADEP are: data processing and
Dependability Modeling
editing, parameter estimation, graphical data analysis, graphical particularly' MEADE' has the following features:
The modeled configuration has two major components: a plant and a digital safety system which protects the plant by responding to and txocessing challenges. One of the safety systems installed in the generation and ~-Support for data conversion: Structured data in a variety of formats (ASCII Delimited Text, Access", dB ASE@, Paradox@, etc.) can be converted to the MEADEP data format. plant studied-was the-Eagle 21 [Westinghouse911 digital safety system. A 3-level hierarchical model was developed for this configuration where levels 2 and 3 were based on the architecture of Eagle 21. Figure 1 shows the top-level plant model which reflects the intermittent Operating profile.' Figure 2 shows the middle-level model, a safety system which consists of four channels working on a basis of 2-out-of-4 votes for a reactor trip (shut down reactor). Figure 3 shows the bottom-level model, a single channel which Estimation of parameters from data: Typically used parameters (failure rate, coverage, etc.) and their upper and lower bounds at a certain level of confidence are estimated by statistical routines taken from mature numerical libraries.
Graphical Presentations of data:
A number of graphical formats are provided to display dependability characteristics for data and results evaluated from models cokists of four components. In this analysis, channel failures are assumed to be ofthe Byzantine type3 because this type is the worst case failure mode and is hazardous to the protection function. The Graphical Input of models: A graphical "drag and drop" interface allows the user to create models hierarchically out of reliability block diagrams (including the k-out-of-n block) and Markov reward models [Goyal87] . In Figure 1 , if a challenge arrives in the normawsafe state, the safety system will respond to it successfully with probability Ps and go to the safety processing ctate S , (modeled by transition PS*rr from S, to Sps). During the safety processing, if the safety system fails due to random failures, the plant will be in the hazard state (transition A,,, from S,, to Sph). Otherwise, the safety system will go back to the normaysafe state after the mean processing time t (transition Ut, from S, to SnJ. When a challenge arrives in the normdsafe state, the safety system may respond to it unsuccessfully due to hardwardsoftware design or implementation problems and go to the plant hazard state (transition (1 -P,)*r, from S, to Sph).4 Thus, maximizing Ps is the major goal for this model. Sometimes the safety system random failures occur in the normdsafe state and enters the safety failure state S,, (transition a, , , from S,, to SSf). ' The safety system will go back to the normawsafe state when the safety system failure is detected and handled (transition pss, from SSf to Sm). But during the failure detection and handling period in the state Ssf, should a challenge arrive, the plant would fail to initiate a trip and would go to the plant hazard state (transition r, from S,, to Sph) because the safety system is not able to vote for "trip" in this state.
In Figure 2 , each channel can fail with its output left at either a state voting for "no trip" or a state voting for "trip", before the failure is detected and handled. When at least three channels have failed (due to either independent or common mode faults) and have left at least three votes for "no trip" (state Sm), the safety system would not respond a challenge correctly because the required 2-outof-4 votes for "trip" never satisfy in this state. This state is regarded as the failure state of the safety system and is equivalent to state S,, in Figure 1 . Minimizing the occupancy probability of this state is the major goal for this model. The common mode failure rate (aam) and the failure detection and handling time (T&) are key parameters for minimizing this occupancy probability. All of the other states in this model do not affect the ability of the safety system to vote for "trip" in case a challenge arrives, and therefore none of them is designated as a failure state.
The diagram shown in Figure 3 is a rough modeling of the four components in an Eagle 21 channel. Although the four components can be further decomposed at lower levels, this further detailed modeling will not have much impact on the results because the single channel failure rate has little effect on the results, according to our sensitivity study.
Parameter Estimation
The data source was the failure reports in letter form generated for the early use of Eagle 21, including the debugging phase of its initial installation, in the Sequoyah Unit 1 and Unit 2 during a 2-year period [TVA90] . Since the initial debugging, Eagle 21 has been operating in the field without a common mode failure for at least 10 years. For the purposes of this study, this data set which reflects the reliability of Eagle 21 in the early installation and operational phase was used to estimate upper bounds of channel level failure rates.
In our previous study [Tang96] , most of the failures in the above data were found to be hardware problems and only a few of them were identified to be software related. The study classified these failures by the Eagle 21 components, as shown in Table 1 , which permits to estimate the A's in Figure 3 . Based on the reported dates, it was identified that the failure data represented a total of 1,130 operational unit days. Since each unit has four channels, this translates to a total of 108,480 operational channel hours. Thus, the channel component level A's can be calculated from this information.
The results are also listed in Table 1 , where the mean failure rates, instead of the upper bounds of failure rates, are estimated. This is because the underlying failure data reflect the early phase reliability of Eagle 21 whose current reliability should be much better. Notice that failure rates estimated from these detected failures can be viewed as upper bounds of the Byzantine type failures modeled.
4An example of such failures is that the software makes a wrong judgement on an unusual combination of sensed physical parameters such that it fails to initiate a necessary trip.
5An example of such failures is that a problem (e.g., memory leaking) of the underlying operating system blocks the running of the application software for all channels, i.e., a common mode failure. For all other parameters, because of lacking real data, they were assumed to take typical or conservative values, as shown in Figures  2-4 , for the demonstration purpose. Some key parameters will be varied on reasonable rahges in the following sensitivity analysis. 
Sensitivity Analysis
The dependability measure to evaluate in this analysis is the plant Mean Time Between Hazards (MTBH), i.e., the mean time to state S , (Figure 1 ) which represents a failure of the safety system to initiate a necessary reactor trip in response to a challenge due to its computer hardware or software (design or random) faults. The MEADEP parametric analysis functionality was used on the above model to investigate the impact of the following three parameters upon the plant MTBH: (1) the safety system common mode failure rate A , , , (2) the safety system failure detection and handling time Tdh, and (3) the probability of success upon demand Ps. When one of these parameters was selected for sensitivity study, it was varied in a reasonable range and all of the other parameters remained unchanged. Figure 4 shows the results on the parameter P,. 
Figure 4 Sensitivity of Plant MTBH to Ps
The results showed that the plant MTBH is not very sensitive to A, , , , and T,,,,. For the selected parameter ranges, the variance of MTBH is about 8% and 2%. However, the plant MTBH is extremely sensitive to Ps: when Ps increases from 0.999 to 1, MTBH increases from 1000 years to 291,000 years, i.e., an increase by 290 times (Figure 4 ). The largest increment segment is between 0.99999 and 0.999999 (from 74,500 years to 225,600 years) and achieving a value in this range is the most rewarding. It is clear that the most important parameter is Ps, the probability of success upon demand, and achieving a high value and estimating the achieved value for this parameter should be a key effort in the system development.
One approach to estimating Ps is by means of measuring the proportion of successful test runs from test data. Stress testing techniques may be needed to accelerate the arrival rate of challenges from the plant requiring a response of the safety system. Because safety systems typically have fairly simple and well defined functions, and because these functions must generally be unambiguous and effective, their success can be described as a simple Bemoulli trial and the MEADEP DEA module can be used to determine the confidence interval for this measure. However, the validity of this approach is based on the assumption that the test environment is representative of the plant operational environment. But determining whether the test environment is sufficiently similar to the operational environment is not always straightforward.
Conclusion
In this paper, we discussed a measurement-based dependability modeling and evaluation tool -MEADEP. MEADEP provides a user-friendly, graphical interface on Windows 95 for non-expert users. Features of MEADEP include: converting data in various formats to the MEADEP format, graphical data presentation and parameter estimation, graphically building of dependability models, availability/ reliability calculation and parametric analysis. Use of the tool on failure data from measurements produces quantitative assessments of dependability for critical systems, while greatly reducing requirements for specialized skills in data processing, statistical analysis, and dependability modeling from the user. We also demonstrated the application of MEADEP on safety systems by modeling and analyzing a nuclear power plant's safety system based on the Eagle 21 architecture and its early field failure data. A sensitivity analysis was performed on reasonable parameter ranges. The study quantified the effect of the parameter "probability of success upon demand" on the plant MTBH and identified the most rewarding segment for this parameter.
Normdsafe state in which either both plant and safety system are functioning within technical specifications or the plant is in a safe trip (reactor is shut down safely) Safety processing state in which the safety system is processing a challenge Safety failure state in which the safety system is not able to respond to a challenge properly while the plant is functioning within technical specifications Plant hazard state which is the result of a failure of the safety system to process a challenge successfully in terms of initiating a necessary reactor trip Probability of success upon demand, i.e., the safety system will be successful in responding a challenge (initially set to 0.9999) Arrival rate of challenges from the plant requiring a response of the safety system (assumed to be once a year, a typical value) Challenge processing time (assumed to be a half hour, a conservative assumption) Failure rate of the safety system (evaluated from the safety system model in Figure 2 ) Rate for detection and handling of a safety system failure (evaluated from the safety system model in Figure 2 ) Recovery rate of the plant after a hazardous event (which has no impact on the plant MTBH) Normal state in which all the four channels are functioning properly State in which one channel has failed and the output of the failed channel votes for "no trip" State in which one channel has failed and the output of the failed channel votes for "trip" State in which two channels have failed and both failed channels vote for "no trip" State in which two channels have failed and one failed channel votes for "trip" and another failed channel votes for "no trip" State in which two channels have failed and both failed channels vote for "trip" State in which at least three channels have failed and at least three failed channels vote for "no trip"; This state is equivalent to state S, in Figure 1 because the safety system would generate a "no trip" signal should a challenge arrive. State in which three channels have failed and at least one of the failed channels vote for "trip" Plant trip state (reactor is shut down) Probability that the channel output votes for "no trip", given a channel failure (assumed to be 0.5) Failure rate of a channel (evaluated from the channel model in Figure   3 
)
Recovery rate of a channel (evaluated from the channel model in Figure  3 ) Common mode failure rate for the safety system (80% confidence upper bound based on no common mode failure for 10 years) Failure detection and handling time, given that at least three channels have failed (assumed to be one hour) Plant trip duration (assumed to be 50 hours) The YO component of a channel The Loop Processor component of a channel Tester Power a, P The Tester component of a channel The Power supply component of a channel Failure rate and recovery rate for the above components (1 is estimated from failure data and llp is assumed to be one hour)
